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Forgotten Third Parties: Analyzing the contingent association between unshared third 
parties, knowledge overlap and knowledge transfer relationships with outsiders 
 
Abstract 
Third parties play a prominent role in network-based explanations for successful knowledge 
transfer.  Third parties can either be shared or unshared.  Shared third parties signal insider 
status and have a predictable positive effect on knowledge transfer.  Unshared third parties, 
however, signal outsider status and are believed to undermine knowledge transfer.  
Surprisingly, unshared third parties have been ignored in empirical analysis, and so we do not 
know if or know how much unshared third parties contribute to the process.  Using knowledge 
transfer data from an online technical forum, we illustrate how unshared third parties affect the 
rate at which individuals initiate and sustain knowledge transfer relationships.  Empirical results 
indicate that unshared third parties undermine knowledge sharing and they also indicate that the 
magnitude of the negative unshared third party effect declines the more unshared third parties 
overlap in what they know.  Our results provide a more complete view of how third parties 
contribute to knowledge sharing.  The results also advance our understanding of network-based 
dynamics defined more broadly.  By documenting how knowledge overlap among unshared 
third parties moderates their negative influence, our results show when the benefits provided by 
third parties and by bridges (i.e., relationships with outsiders) will be opposed versus when both 
can be enjoyed.
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1. Introduction 
Successful knowledge transfer is essential for a host of organizational processes and 
performance outcomes, including but not limited to improvements in learning rates and overall 
organizational efficiency (Argote et al. 1990; Darr et al. 1995), new product development 
(Hansen 1999; Carlile 2002) and technological innovation (Ahuja 2000; Tortoriello and 
Krackhardt 2010).  As market competition has increased, sharing knowledge has become even 
more important because knowledge transfer influences a firm’s ability to improve and develop 
new products and work routines (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Sørensen and Stuart 2000).  
Indeed, in a dynamic market context, the ability to share knowledge is viewed as a distinct 
source of competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander 1996). 
Explanations for successful knowledge transfer often emphasize the importance of two 
contextual factors – knowledge overlap and network context.  While distinct, knowledge overlap 
and network-based explanations for knowledge transfer emphasize complementary processes 
and dynamics.  In particular, prevailing theoretical arguments cast knowledge overlap as a key 
variable defining transfer costs.  And this is so because individuals often learn new ideas by 
associating those ideas with what they already know (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Simon 1991).  
Thus, when defined in terms of time and effort, transfer costs are lower when a knowledge 
source and potential recipient overlap in what they know and as transfer costs decline, the 
likelihood of successful transfer increases.  Different network features such as tie strength, 
shared third parties, and network range are conceptualized as social resources that facilitate 
knowledge sharing activities by offsetting transfer costs (Tortoriello, Reagans, and McEvily, 
2012).  A network connection is strong when a source and recipient either communicate 
frequently and/or feel emotionally invested in their interaction.  Shared third parties indicate the 
number of mutual contacts a source and recipient have in common and network range captures 
the extent to which the network which surrounds a focal individual draws on contacts from 
different parts of a larger network.  A number of studies have documented the importance of 
4	
	
these network features for successful knowledge transfer (Phelps, Heidl, and Wadhwa, 2012 
provide a systematic review).  For example, prior research has shown that a knowledge source 
is more likely to share what he knows with a recipient when the two are connected by a strong 
relationship either directly or indirectly through mutual shared third party interactions.  Strong 
network connections facilitate pro-social behavior such as knowledge transfer by increasing the 
reputation costs associated with failing to assist fellow members of a group or community 
(Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1990). 
Network and knowledge overlap-based explanations for successful knowledge transfer 
emphasize complementary processes and dynamics.  Prevailing theoretical arguments cast 
knowledge overlap as a key variable defining transfer costs and view different network features 
as resources that facilitate knowledge sharing activities by rendering transfer costs less 
relevant.  The complementary nature of the two processes suggests that it would be worthwhile 
to consider how the two factors combine to shape knowledge sharing outcomes and activities 
(Tortoriello, Reagans, and McEvily, 2012).  We explore this issue by examining how knowledge 
overlap moderates the influence of a network feature that has been overlooked in network-
based explanations for successful knowledge transfer.  In particular, we examine how unshared 
third parties to an interaction affect the likelihood that a knowledge transfer relationship will be 
initiated and maintained over time and we also consider how the degree of knowledge overlap 
among unshared third parties potentially moderates their influence.1 
																																								 																				
1 Our focus on knowledge overlap and different network features isn’t to suggest they are the only determinants of 
successful knowledge transfer.  Prior research had identified a number of factors that can influence knowledge 
transfer (Argote et al. 2003; Phelps et al. 2012), including physical proximity (Hansen and Løvås 2004; Salomon and 
Martin 2008), social similarity (Loyd et al., 2010), and even properties of the knowledge being shared (Szulanski 
1996).  Some of those factors shape transfer costs while others like different network features introduce resources 
that can render those costs less relevant.  While we have focused on knowledge overlap and network features in our 
argument, we believe it would be worthwhile to consider how cost and resource-based factors combine to influence 
knowledge sharing activities.  For example, sharing tacit knowledge is more demanding than sharing codified 
knowledge even after one has controlled for how much a source and recipient overlap in what they know.  And so 
properties of knowledge should also moderate observed network effects.  Features of the source and recipient could 
also play a role.  Sharing an identity can also increase an individual’s willingness to engage in the knowledge transfer 
process (Kane, Argote, Levine 2005), even when it is costly to do so. 
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While it is generally understood that third parties can be shared and unshared, unshared 
third parties have been ignored in previous research analyzing network effects on knowledge 
sharing activities.  The stylized network in Figure 1 illustrates the difference between shared and 
unshared third parties.  The focal interaction is the Sarah-Roy connection.  Sarah is the 
knowledge source and Roy is the recipient.  Alvin and Allen are connected to Sarah and Roy 
and so represent shared third parties to the Sarah-Roy interaction.  A large number of studies 
have established the positive influence that Alvin and Allen can have on the Sarah-Roy 
relationship in general (see Portes and Vickstrom 2011 for a review) and for knowledge transfer 
in particular (see Phelps, Heidl, and Wadhwa 2012 for a review).  The relationships that connect 
Sarah with Bob, Bill and Ben, however, represent unshared third parties to the Sarah-Roy 
interaction because Roy is disconnected from the individuals in group B.  For members of group 
B, Roy is an outsider and the relationships that Sarah has with members of group B can make it 
difficult for Sarah to maintain her relationship with Roy.  The point is that same third parties that 
promote interactions between in-group members can make it more difficult for an individual to 
productively interact with individuals from outside of that group (Granovetter 1973; Burt and 
Knez 1995; Labianca et al. 1998). 
Third parties can shape network dynamics by influencing how people allocate their 
limited network time and energy.  For example, if Sarah decides to spend more time helping her 
contacts in group B, her decision can have implications for her relationsnhps with individuals in 
group A.  When her time is limited, if she decides to spend more time with contacts in group B, 
Sarah must also consider limiting the amount of time she spends with Alvin, Abe, Allen, and 
Roy.  Her relationships with Allen, Abe, and Alvin have the support of third parties, so reducing 
network time and energy in any one of those relationships could be problematic for her 
reputation.  Sarah’s relationship with Roy has less third party support and so as Sarah starts to 
allocate more time to contacts in group B, she could very well decide to end her relationship 
with Roy.  In general, individuals have a limited budget for network activities.  And time 
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consuming activities like knowledge transfer can exhaust that budget more quickly (Levine and 
Prietula 2012).  This suggests that the negative influence that unshared third parties can have 
on relationships with outsiders will be especially pronounced in the context of knoweldge 
transfer relationships. 
The proceeding discussion highlights how unshared third parties can undermine 
knoweldge sharing activities and therefore why it is important to consider unshared third party 
effects in empirical anlaysis.  Given the complementary nature between networks and 
knowledge overlap, it is also important to consider knowledge overlap among unshared third 
parties overlap because the degree of knowledge overlap among unshared third parties could 
determine how difficult it is for an individual to meet their requests for help and assistance.  And 
if this is so, the degree of knowledge of knowledge overlap among unshared third parties could 
offset any negative effect that unshared third parties could have on an individual’s ability to 
maintain relationships with outsiders.  For example, as members of group B begin to overlap in 
their knowledge and expertise, instead of responding to a diverse set of requests for help and 
assistance, it is more likely that Sarah will need to respond to a smaller set of questions, which 
should make it easier for her to satisfy those requests, leaving more network time and energy 
for interactions with contacts outside of group B.  This line of thinking suggests that as unshared 
third parties become more similar in their knowledge and expertise, any negative influence that 
unshared third parties can have on relationships with “outsiders” like Roy should be diminished.  
We develop this argument in greater detail in the next section. 
We test our argument among knowledge workers from a Fortune 1000 IT services firm.  
Global Business magazine, Fortune, reported that this firm is one of the fastest growing firms in 
the United States.  Market success allowed the firm to expand rapidly to different cities, 
countries and continents.  Knowledge transfer was critical for firm success but during the 
expansion little attention was paid to how members of the firm would continue to share 
knowledge with each other.  As a result, different pockets of knowledge emerged between 
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locations over the years.  Senior members of the firm recognized that the absence of knowledge 
transfer was undermining the firm’s performance and the firm took several Enterprise 2.0 
initiatives to encourage knowledge sharing among employees across locations, including the 
knowledge sharing forum analyzed in this study. 
The firm launched the online forum in 2006 and it was adopted across different 
locations.  The forum is technical in nature and employees primarily posted technical queries.  
Once a query was posted, however, anyone in the firm could post an answer to the forum.  The 
forum provided knowledge seekers with greater access to a much larger knowledge pool than 
what would have been possible in the absence of such a forum.  The firm did not provide any 
direct incentive to participate in the technical forum.  However, over approximately a year, 
approximately 17,000 questions were posted to the forum which received more than 20,000 
responses.  The forum kept track of individuals who sought assistance and the names of 
individuals who responded to their requests.  As a result, we can measure the network context 
in which knowledge transfer occurs.  Queries were posted to specific subjects and domains and 
individuals who responded to queries posted in a specific domain revealed their knowledge and 
expertise.  Thus, in addition to measuring shared and unshared third party ties, we can also 
measure how much people overlap in what they know and therefore we can also examine how 
knowledge overlap moderates any association between unshared third party ties and the 
likelihood a knowledge transfer relationship is initiated and sustained over time.2 
																																								 																				
2	The widespread use of electronic data in network analysis has been met with some skepticism.  Some worry about 
the extent to which “online” data actually corresponds to relationships “offline.”  Analysis of email data suggests that 
there is (Wuchty and Uzzi 2011; Quintaine and Kleinbaum 2011).  A related issue is the extent to which network 
processes and dynamics that have been documented offline occur in online settings.  We are assuming they do, and 
there is empirical evidence in support of our position (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011; Burt 2012).  This isn’t to suggest 
that all “social” networks are the same.  Social media networks like Facebook or Twitter often have features that 
make them distinct from offline social networks. It would, therefore, be a mistake to reduce social media networks to 
social networks (Kane et al., 2014).  Indeed, there is growing body of research describing how platform features can 
both constrain but also enable effective knowledge transfer online (Majchrzak et al., 2013).  Research findings to be 
presented suggest the “online” forum we study exhibits network-based dynamics and processes similar to “offline” 
social networks studied in the past. 
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To preview our empirical results, we find that unshared third parties reduce the likelihood 
that a knowledge transfer relationship would be initiated and sustained over time and we also 
find that the magnitude of this negative effect declines as unshared third parties became more 
similar in their knowledge and expertise.  Our results provide a more complete view of how third 
parties affect knowledge sharing.  While prior research has emphasized the positive influence 
shared third parties can have on knowledge sharing, our results illustrate how the same third 
parties that promote interactions with insiders can also make it more difficult for an individual to 
share knowledge with outsiders.  Our results also advance our understanding of network-based 
dynamics defined more broadly.  For example, the Sarah-Roy relationship in Figure 1 is a 
bridge and prior research has shown that bridges provide a number of information and 
knowledge-based benefits (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008a), 
especially when they are strong (Burt, 1992).  Indeed, strong bridges are essential in high 
information and knowledge environments because weak bridges lack sufficient bandwidth to 
support successful transfer (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011).  But as we have described above, 
third parties can make it difficult for an individual to initiate and maintain bridges (Granovetter, 
1973).  And thus, the benefits provided by bridges and third parties are often viewed in 
opposition.  The benefits created by one can be expected to come at the expense of the 
benefits introduced by the other.  By illustrating how knowledge overlap among unshared third 
parties moderates the negative effect that unshared third parties can have on relationships with 
outsiders, our results show when the benefits provided by third parties and by bridges will be in 
stark opposition versus when both network-based benefits can be realized and enjoyed. 
 
2. Third Parties: Shared and Unshared 
Shared Third Parties, Collaboration, and Reputation Costs 
The importance of shared third parties in the context of knowledge transfer has been 
established across a number of studies, including individual knowledge workers (Gargiulo, 
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Gokhan, and Galunic 2009), hotel managers (Ingram and Roberts 2000), design engineers 
(Obstfeld 2005), and individuals working in research and development (Tortoriello and 
Krackhardt 2010).  Shared third parties are important because they can help to align individual 
behavior with more collective goals and objectives (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1988; Grief 
1989).  In any group or organization, conflicts of interest can develop between what is best for 
the organization and what is best for each individual member of the organization.  For example, 
the successful transfer of knowledge can be beneficial for a recipient and the broader 
organization, but sharing knowledge can be costly for the source.  At a minimum, a source must 
spend time sharing what he knows (Reagans and McEvily 2003).  Successful knowledge 
transfer can also be costly for the recipient who must dedicate time and effort to figuring out how 
to use whatever knowledge he has acquired in his work context (Tortoriello, Reagans, and 
McEvily 2012).  Indeed, successful knowledge transfer can introduce dynamics that undermine 
subsequent transfer because the more two individuals overlap in what they know, the more they 
potentially compete against each other for status and attention inside the group or larger 
organization.  A focus on status-based competition helps to explain why individuals often prefer 
knowledge originating from outside of their organization or organizational unit (Menon and 
Pfeffer 2003; Menon et al. 2006). 
Shared third party ties facilitate pro-social behavior by raising the reputation costs 
associated with failing to provide help and assistance.  When two individuals in an interaction 
are connected to the same third parties, news of uncooperative behavior travels among those 
third parties quickly (Coleman 1988).  And those very same shared third parties are positioned 
to sanction an offending party, for example by refusing to cooperate with him in the future (Grief 
1989).  Thus, when shared third parties are present, individuals collaborate in general and share 
knowledge in particular out of a desire to protect their reputation.  In the context of knowledge 
transfer, this means that individuals share what they know, in part, to preserve their rights to 
request assistance from their colleagues in the future. 
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Unshared Third Parties, Self-Interests, and Decay 
Third parties can also be unshared.  The available empirical evidence indicates that unshared 
third parties make it difficult for an individual to maintain a strong relationship with outsiders 
(Burt and Knez 1995; Labianca et al. 1998).  Cognitive factors could account for the negative 
influence that unshared third parties can have on relationships with outsiders (Heider 1946).  
For example, Sarah has strong ties with Roy and Bob, but Roy and Bob are disconnected.  If 
the relationships in figure 1 are friendships, it is cognitively more demanding for Sarah to be 
friends with Roy and Bob who are not friends than it is for Sarah to be friends with Bob and Ben 
who are friends.  The Sarah-Bob, Sarah-Ben, and Bob-Ben interactions are balanced, while the 
Sarah-Bob, Sarah-Roy, and Bob-Roy interactions are not.  Imbalanced relationships are more 
difficult to maintain and one way to restore balance would be for Bob and Roy to become 
friends.  Balance would also be restored if Sarah ended her relationship with either Roy or with 
Bob.  Since Sarah’s relationships around Bob are more balanced than her relationships around 
Roy, if she is forced to select one, she is more likely to end her relationship with Roy. 
The negative effect that unshared third parties can have on relationships with outsiders 
could be rooted in more self-interested behavior. 	For example, the third parties in group B could 
be interested in continuing to receive whatever benefits their relationship with Sarah provides, 
and as their relationships with each other become stronger; they are in a better position to 
demand more from her, including requests for more knowledge and information.  And if we 
assume that Sarah has a limited amount of time and effort she can allocate to sharing 
knowledge, providing more assistance to contacts in B should increases the odds that one or 
some or her relationships in group A will end.  But some of Sarah’s relationships with people in 
group A are in a more stable position than others.  The reputation costs associated with ending 
a relationship with an insider are higher than the reputation costs associated with ending a 
relationship with an outsider.  If Sarah is forced to withdraw from any relationship in A as 
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demands in B increase, she is more likely to withdraw wherever the reputation costs associated 
with doing so are lower.  The reputation costs associated with withdrawing from her relationship 
with Allen or Abe are higher than the costs associated with withdrawing from the relationship 
with Roy.  And this fact means that the relationship that Sarah has with Roy is more likely to 
end, as the requests for help and assistance in group B increase.3  Thus, consistent with prior 
research on the negative influences of unshared third parties, we expect for unshared third 
parties to have a negative effect on the knowledge transfer process. 
While we have discussed and will analyze the association between unshared third 
parties and knowledge transfer, we are primarily interested in how overlap in knowledge among 
unshared third parties moderates the negative effect unshared third parties can have on 
knowledge transfer relationships with outsiders.  The negative unshared third party effect could 
be rooted in balance or the fact that third parties are interested in continuing to secure whatever 
resources a contact provides.  In the current empirical context, knowledge workers are 
concerned with being productive and acquiring knowledge can improve their productivity.  If the 
contacts in group B are primarily concerned with receiving knowledge from Sarah, increasing 
knowledge overlap within group B should moderate the negative effect that strong ties within 
group B can create for relationships with people from outside of B.  In particular, as knowledge 
overlap among members of group B increases, the number of distinct demands that each 
person in B represents for Sarah should also decline.  For example, if individuals only possess 
																																								 																				
3	An additional mechanism which also assumes self-interested third parties is gossip (Burt and Knez 1995).  
According to this argument, the third parties surrounding Sarah are primarily concerned with maintaining their 
relationship with her, and out of a desire to maintain that relationship, simply echo back whatever she wants to hear.  
In particular, whenever difficulties occur in an interaction, the relationship is at risk for decay.  Unshared third parties 
exacerbate the problem.  Since they are primarily concerned with maintaining their relationship with Sarah, if she 
should ask their opinion about the offending party, they are likely to echo back whatever negative emotions she is 
experiencing at that particular moment in time.  The end result is to undermine the relationship with the offending 
party even more.  Mutual or shared third parties act to restore a relationship after a difficult encounter and primarily 
because they are interested in maintaining their relationships with both parties.  Sarah’s relationship with Bob is 
surrounded by shared third parties, which help to maintain and restore the relationship after a difficult event.  Sarah’s 
relationship with Roy lacks this kind of support and so if Sarah should share negative emotions after a difficult 
interaction with Roy, they echo them back which serves to undermine Sarah’s relationship with Roy.  We focus on 
third parties who are interested in securing resources, as opposed to simply maintaining relationships, because it 
seems like a more plausible explanation in our empirical context. 	
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expertise in one domain, when the members of group B are completely heterogeneous, Sarah 
must satisfy increasing requests with respect to three knowledge domains.  When the members 
of group B overlap completely, Sarah must satisfy increasing demands with respect to one 
domain.  While it is certainly the case that meeting increasing demands in one domain will make 
it difficult for her to maintain knowledge transfer relationships outside of group B, it is also true 
that meeting increasing demands across multiple knowledge domains will make it even more 
difficult to maintain external knowledge transfer relationships.  This line of argument leads to the 
following prediction. 
H1: The negative effect that unshared third parties have on knowledge transfer becomes 
less negative as the degree of knowledge overlap among them increases. 
 
3. Methods and Measures 
Technical workers at a Fortune 1000 IT services firm were our study population.  Market 
success had allowed the original firm to expand geographically to multiple cities, countries and 
continents.  With the expansion, firm performance started to suffer.  Managers understood that 
knowledge transfer had been essential for early success and were looking for activities to 
encourage the transfer of knowledge between people in different geographic locations.  The firm 
took several Enterprise 2.0 initiatives to encourage knowledge sharing among employees 
across locations, including the knowledge sharing forum analyzed in this study. 
The online forum was launched in 2006 with the explicit intent of encouraging transfer 
across the different locations.  The forum was technical in nature and employees primarily 
posted technical questions.  Questions were posted to specific topics and once a question was 
posted, anyone in the firm could post a response.  The forum provided knowledge seekers with 
greater access to a much larger knowledge pool than what would have been possible in the 
absence of such a forum.  We have data on all questions and responses from April 2006 until 
August 2007.  During the 16 month period, 17,386 questions were posted and those questions 
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received 20,421 responses.  The forum kept track of individuals who sought assistance and the 
names of individuals who responded to their requests.  So the identities of individuals were 
visible on the forum.  Moreover, these archival records allow us to observe a knowledge transfer 
network evolving over the 16 month period.  A knowledge transfer relationship exists between 
two individuals when one had responded to a question posted by the other.  Our knowledge 
transfer network was updated daily so knowledge transfer relationships were allowed to develop 
and grow stronger but could also decay over time. 
 
Dependent Variable – Sharing Knowledge. The dependent variable, Ysrq, is an indicator variable 
which equals 1 if a potential knowledge source s responds to the question q posted by potential 
knowledge recipient r and 0 otherwise.  We focus on the likelihood of an individual responding 
to a colleague’s question.  Most responses were posted within a few hours and differences in 
time zones made it difficult to measure the time lapse between when a potential knowledge 
source was exposed to a question and when he or she posted a response.  While individuals 
could have responded to a question more than once, this was very rare.  Individuals responded 
to the same question more than once only thirty-nine times.  While the typical person only 
posted a single response, like most technical forums more than one person could have 
responded to a question.  And since more than one person can respond to a question, we have 
more answers than questions. 
 
Independent Variables 
Third Parties: We examine how an increase in the relative number of unshared third parties will 
affect the likelihood that an individual with respond and continue to respond to a colleague’s 
requests.  The workers in our study population can belong to more than one network 
neighborhood and so the stylized network in figure 1 is again useful for illustrating different kinds 
of third parties.  The focus relationship is the relationship between Sarah (s) and Roy (r).  s and 
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r share a number of third parties in group A but s is involved in a number of relationships in 
group B that represent unshared third parties for the s-r interaction.  
To measure the intensity of shared and unshared third party ties, we first calculated the 
strength of the direct ties in the knowledge sharing network.  The individuals in our study 
population can act as knowledge sources and recipients in our knowledge transfer relationships.  
A knowledge transfer relationship exists between s and r if either one has responded to a 
question posted by the other.  Thus the data are counts.  We know the number of times s has 
responded to a question posted by r and we know the number of times that r has responded to 
questions posted by s.  To measure the strength of the relationship s has with r, we first sum the 
number of times s has responded to r and the number of times r has responded to s.  𝑁𝑠𝑟𝑡 +𝑁𝑟𝑠𝑡 is the level of the relationship between s and r at time t.  It is important to remove volume 
or level from our network measures (Burt and Carlton 1989).  One approach is to express each 
interaction as a function of the maximum interaction involving the focal individual at time t, which 
for individual s is max (𝑁𝑠𝑞𝑡 + 𝑁𝑞𝑠𝑡) (Reagans and McEvily 2003; Tortoriello et al. 2012).  Thus, 
the marginal strength of the relationship from s to r at time t is calculated as 𝑍!"# = !"#$!!"#$!"# (!"#$!!"#$), where 𝑁!"# is the number of times s has responded to questions posted by 
r at time t and 𝑁!"# is the number of times r has responded to questions posted by s at time t 
and max(𝑁𝑠𝑞𝑡 + 𝑁𝑞𝑠𝑡) is the strongest relationship s has with anyone on the forum at time t.  
These marginal strength relationships were used to calculate our network measures.4  Our 
shared third party variable increases to the extent there are individuals like q who have strong 
connections with s and r.  If our network data were binary, our shared third party variable would 
simply be the number of third parties that s and r have in common (Burt 2007). 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑇𝑃!"#  =  𝑍!"#𝑍!"#!  
																																								 																				
4 We measure tie strength using marginal relationships to be consistent with prior research (Reagans and McEvily 
2003; Tortoriello et al. 2012). Empirical results to be presented lead to the same substantive conclusions if we 
measure tie strength using the original count data. 
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Our measure of unshared third parties increases to the extent the focal individual s had strong 
ties to contacts q and k and those colleagues were disconnected from the focal contact r.  Again 
with binary network data, our unshared third party variable would be the number of “Simmelian” 
or closed triads (Krackhardt 1999) surrounding s that do not involve the focal respondent r.5 
𝑈𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑃!"# =   𝑍!"#𝑍!"#𝑍!"#!!!,!!!!!!  
We have called our two network measures the number of shared and unshared third parties but 
it is important to emphasize that both variables are indicators of triadic closure. Our shared and 
unshared third party variables are conceptually identical to the triadic closure measures used by 
Krackhardt (1999, pg. 108), Burt (2007, pg. 14), and other scholars who study network effects 
on individual, team and organizational outcomes.  Triadic closure measures are rooted in the 
idea that group dynamics occur in collectives of three or more people.  An issue, of course, is 
how triadic effects aggregate as the size of the collective increases.  Consistent with prior work, 
we assume triadic effects are additive. 
 
Knowledge Expertise:  Questions on the technical forum were posted to specific topic areas or 
domains.  There were eighty-nine topics on the forum.  An individual “expressed” or signaled his 
or her knowledge and expertise based on where he or she posted answers.  We constructed a 
vector of expertise,𝑉!, for each individual based on the questions he or she has answered.  The 
value corresponding to element 𝑉!(𝑒), represents the number of questions on topic e answered 
by individual s.6  We constructed the vector 𝑉! using information on how s responded to 
questions posted on the forum during the 16 month time period.  Thus our knowledge or 
																																								 																				
5 Our network variables are unadjusted in the sense we do not divide our shared third party variable by the number of 
contacts maintained by the focal individual s and we do not divide our unshared third party variable by the number of 
closed triads surrounding s that did not involve the focal respondent r.  We have focused on the unadjusted network 
variables because we believe the extent of these interactions is as important as their average strength.  However, we 
reach the same substantive conclusions if we adjust our shared third party variable by the number of contacts and 
our unshared third party variable by the number of unshared closed triads.  
6 Empirical results to be presented lead to the same substantive conclusions if we define an individual’s expertise as 
a function of where he or she has posted questions and answers. 
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expertise variable was not time dependent.  We can relax this assumption and assume an 
individual only has expertise on a topic if he or she has responded to a question on the topic 
prior to the day when a focal question was posted. The time dependent expertise variable and 
time constant variable are correlated at 0.99 and results based on either measure lead to the 
same substantive conclusions. 
Knowledge Overlap: We calculate the level of dyadic knowledge overlap (𝐷𝐾𝑂!") between two 
individuals s and r as the un-centered correlation of their knowledge expertise vectors (Jaffe 
1986).  Dyadic knowledge overlap varies from zero to one, with a value of one indicating 
maximum knowledge overlap. 
𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 = 𝐷𝐾𝑂!" = 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′  
Knowledge Overlap among Third Parties: Knowledge overlap among third parties can vary from 
high to low.  We expect for the magnitude of the estimated third party effects to vary with the 
amount of knowledge overlap among them.  We calculated knowledge overlap at the network 
level using triads.  To calculate knowledge overlap among shared third parties, we calculate the 
average dyadic knowledge overlap among s, r, and q for every q connected to s and r.  We sum 
across every such q to define the level of shared triadic knowledge overlap. 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑝 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 =  𝐾𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑃!"
= 1/3 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′ + 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′ + 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′!  
To calculate knowledge overlap among unshared third parties, we calculated the average 
dyadic knowledge overlap among s, q, and k for every q and k connected to s and but not 
connected to r and we summed across every such q and k.7 
																																								 																				
7 As with our network variables, our measures of knowledge among shared and unshared third parties were not 
adjusted by the number of contacts maintained by the focal individual s or the number of closed triads surrounding s 
that did not involve the focal respondent r, respectively.  We have focused on the unadjusted knowledge variables for 
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𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑈𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝐾𝑂𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑃!"
= 1/3 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′ + 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′ + 𝑉!𝑉!′𝑉!𝑉!′ 𝑉!𝑉!′!!!;!!!!!!  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to the intensity of shared third party relationships, prior research has established the 
importance of tie strength and network range for knowledge transfer.  Recall that tie strength 
was measured as the marginal strength of the relationship from s to r at time t.  𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  𝑍!"# = !"#$!!!"#!"#! (!"#$!!"#$)   
Our indicator of network range was information centrality (Stephenson and Zelen 1989; 
Brandes and Fleischer 2005; Tortoriello, Reagans, and McEvily 2012).  Like closeness 
centrality, information centrality is a function of the path distance between any two actors. Unlike 
closeness centrality, however, which gives maximum weight to the shortest path between two 
actors, information centrality considers all paths and assigns greater weights to shorter paths. 
Individuals who were high on information centrality were connected to nonequivalent contacts in 
the knowledge transfer network, and thus individuals who were high on information centrality 
were more likely to be connected to non-redundant knowledge and expertise.  We control for 
the centrality of the source and recipient in our analysis. 
Prior research has also established that similarity with respect to demographic 
characteristics, such as age, gender, and tenure can affect knowledge sharing behavior.  Our 
demographic data is limited.  We only have demographic data for gender.  To control for any 
effect gender-based similarity can have on the knowledge transfer process, we created two 
indicator variables, both female and both male.  The both female indicator is set equal to one if 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
the same reason we focused on the unadjusted network variables.  However, models that use the adjusted network 
and knowledge variables lead to the same substantive conclusions as the models that use the unadjusted network 
and knowledge variables. 
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the recipient and source were both female and remained equal to zero otherwise.  The both 
male indicator variable was set equal to one if the source and recipient were both male and 
remained equal to zero otherwise.  Interactions involved men and women were the excluded 
category in our analysis.  We also controlled for similarity with respect to work roles and 
responsibilities.  The firm formally distinguished forty-seven job classifications (e.g., data 
analyst, SAS programmer, director, Senior IT Security Specialist).  While we know each 
individual’s classification, we do not know exactly the activities each job classification entails.  
With more detailed information on what each work activity entailed, we could construct an 
indicator of how much two individuals overlapped in their work roles and responsibilities and 
therefore, the extent to which they were potentially more relevant as knowledge exchange 
partners.  To control for any influence that task similarity could have on knowledge sharing, we 
created an indicator variable for pairs of classifications (e.g., SAS programmer and data 
analyst).  Three hundred and eighty-two of the job classification pairs had a sufficient number of 
observations to be included as controls in our models.  The indicators variables are estimated in 
our model but are not displayed in the tables. 
We know where each individual worked and so could control for the extent to which two 
individuals worked at the same geographic location.  It is important to control for geographic 
proximity because two individuals who are in close proximity have more opportunities to develop 
stronger network connections or to simply become more aware of each other.  Either dynamic 
could increase the odds of a knowledge source responding a question posted by a potential 
recipient.  Our same geographic location variable is set equal to one if the potential recipient 
and source work at the same location and remains equal to zero otherwise. 
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17,386 questions were posted to the technical forum during the 16 month period we studied.8  
1,201 individuals could have responded to each question. The 17,386 X 1,201 question-source 
pairs are the units of analysis.  We have multiple observations for each potential recipient r and 
we have multiple responses from each knowledge source s.  The observations are clustered 
within knowledge sources and within potential recipients.  Clustering can artificially reduce the 
size of our standard errors and inflate our significance tests.  To adjust our standard errors for 
clustering, we introduced a random effect for each knowledge source and for each knowledge 
recipient.  The crossed random effects adjust our standard errors for clustering.  The individual 
random effects also allow us to control for the influence of unobserved and unmeasured factors 
(e.g., age, and tenure) could have had on the knowledge transfer process.  While the crossed 
random effects controlled for unmeasured features of an individual either as a source or a 
recipient, they do not control for unobserved features of a relationship between two individuals 
that could have affected the likelihood they would initiate and continue to share knowledge with 
each other.  To control for unmeasured features of each relationship that could have affect 
knowledge transfer, we also introduced a dyadic random effect for every pair of individuals 
(Reagans 2011). 
Given the dyadic random effects specification and the large size of our data 
(approximately 20 million rows), the total amount of computation time was large.  This is a 
challenge that is often encountered in large scale dyad-level studies of networks (e.g., Braun 
and Bonfrer 2011; Kleinbaum, Stuart, and Tushman 2013).  Further, an estimation approach 
based on random sampling was not practical with our data since the instances where a potential 
source replied to a recipient was extremely rare.  For approximately 20 million observations 
there were only 20421 instances where the dependent variable equaled 1.  Hence, to deal with 
the computational requirements of our dyad-level model with time-varying covariates, we 
																																								 																				
8 Our empirical results lead to the same substantive conclusions if we ignore the first 6 months of the technical forum.  
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estimated our model with the recently proposed Weighted Exogenous Sampling with Bayesian 
Inference (WESBI) (Lu et al 2013).  
To employ WESBI, we collected all of the instances where the dependent variable was 
one, and randomly sampled 15% of the observations where the dependent variable equaled 
zero.  By combining these two sets of observations, we constructed a much smaller dataset 
(“sampled data”).  And then, we used the weighted log-conditional-likelihood function for 
Bayesian inference over our sampled data (Lu et al. 2013). The intuition behind the weighted 
log-conditional-likelihood is to weigh each sampled observation by the population elements it 
represents in order to make the choice-based sample simulate a random exogenous sample.  
The WESBI method reduces the time of estimation by an order of magnitude, while still 
providing consistent estimates. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The estimation results are provided in Table 1.  While we are concerned with how 
unshared third parties affect the knowledge transfer process, the estimates for shared third 
parties are informative.  We considered two distinct kinds of interactions in our empirical 
analysis.  We first considered how our network variables affected the likelihood an individual 
would initiate a knowledge transfer relationship and then we considered how the same network 
variables affected the likelihood a knowledge transfer relationship would be sustained over time.  
The individuals in column 1 had never shared knowledge with each other.  The estimate for 
shared third parties in column 1 is positive and significant.  The estimate indicates that a 
knowledge source was more likely to respond to a request posted by a network neighbor.  The 
results in model 2 focus on individuals who had shared knowledge with each other in the past.  
And since we control for the relative number of times they have shared knowledge with each 
other in the past, one can interpret the estimates as capturing the rate at which their relationship 
is getting stronger over time.  The results indicate that shared third parties increased the 
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likelihood a knowledge source would sustain a knowledge transfer relationship.  The estimates 
in models 1 and 2 illustrate the positive effect shared third parties can have on the knowledge 
transfer process.  Shared third parties made it more likely that a knowledge source would 
respond to a question posted by a colleague and would continue to respond to future requests. 
The estimates from models 3 and 4 illustrate the negative effects unshared third parties can 
have on external relationships.  The individuals in column 3 were disconnected while the 
individuals in column 4 had shared knowledge with one another in the past.  The estimate for 
unshared third parties is negative and significant in models 3 and 4.  Unshared third parties 
made it less likely that a source would respond to a question and even if the source had 
responded to a previous request (perhaps formed when the intensity of unshared third parties 
was lower), that he or she would continue to respond to future inquires.  Overall, the results in 
models 1-4 illustrate the positive and negative influences associated with third parties.  Third 
parties facilitate knowledge transfer among insiders but undermine sharing knowledge with 
outsiders.  We are interested in how knowledge overlap among unshared third parties 
moderates the magnitude of their negative influence but it is worth noting that while the 
unshared third party effect is generally understood, the negative unshared third party effect is 
rarely documented empirically. 
Our predictions are tested in models 5 and 6.  The individuals in model 5 had never 
shared knowledge, while the individuals in model 6 had.  Model 5 contains an interaction 
between unshared third parties and the degree of knowledge overlap among unshared third 
parties.  Model 6 includes a three-way interaction between our tie strength variable, unshared 
third parties and the degree of knowledge overlap among unshared third parties because the 
source and recipient had shared knowledge previously.  It can be difficult to interpret two-way 
and three-way interactions, so we calculated the simple slope for unshared third parties when 
knowledge overlap among unshared third parties was high (i.e., 1.5 standard deviations above 
its mean) and low (1.5 standard deviations below its mean) (Aiken et al. 1991).  The results for 
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the estimates in model 5 are in Table 2.  When we focus on individuals who have never shared 
knowledge, the results indicate that the negative unshared third parties effect was less negative 
when the degree of knowledge overlap among unshared third parties was high versus when it 
was low.  We observed similar results when we focused on individuals who had shared 
knowledge before.  In addition to calculating the simple slope for unshared third parties when 
knowledge overlap among unshared third parties was high and low, we also calculated the 
simple slope when tie strength was either high and low.  The results are in Table 3.  The 
negative effect that unshared third parties had on continuing to share knowledge was less 
negative when knowledge overlap among unshared third parties was high versus low.  The 
magnitude of the negative unshared third parties effect doesn’t appear to vary with the strength 
of the relationship between the knowledge source and recipient.  Overall, the results provide 
support for our predictions.  Unshared third parties undermined knowledge transfer and the 
magnitude of their negative influence declined when they overlapped in their knowledge and 
expertise. 
 
Robustness Checks 
The empirical results reported above provide empirical support for our argument.  In addition to 
the models discussed above, we estimated a number of models to evaluate the robustness of 
our conclusions to different assumptions about our dependent and independent variables.  For 
example, we have focused in our analysis on the likelihood a knowledge source would respond 
to a potential recipient.  We also estimated models in which our dependent variable was length 
of response (i.e., the number of words used in response to a question), conditional on 
responding to a question.  Estimates from those models led to the same conclusions as the 
findings discussed in our results section.  While length of response might seem more 
appropriate because it could capture strength of connection (i.e., number of words used in a 
response could indicate how much time and effort an individual allocated to answering a 
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question), length of response could also introduce noise in our outcome variable.  Length of 
response could have varied with features of the question, who asked (some people are more 
verbose and more verbose questions could have generated more verbose responses), or who 
responded.  Given these issues we focused in our primary analysis on less fine-grained binary 
outcome variable. 
Second, we included in our models dyadic random effects to adjust our estimates for 
unmeasured features of each interaction that could have affected the likelihood a knowledge 
source responded to a recipient.  The dyadic random effects in our model were assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the predictors in our regression equations.  Estimating a model with dyadic 
fixed effects would have allowed unmeasured features of each dyad to be correlated with our 
predictors.  While we would have preferred to estimate models with dyadic fixed effects, we 
lacked sufficient variation at the dyad level to do so.  Our data, however, did allow us to let a 
subject of our predictors to be correlated with our dyadic random effects (Hausman and Taylor 
1981).  We had sufficient variation at the dyadic level to allow our network centrality variables to 
be correlated with our dyadic random effects.  Empirical results from these models lead to the 
same conclusions as the models discussed above. 
Third, the online technical forum we analyzed cut across different geographic locations.  
We controlled for geographic proximity in our analysis but it is possible that geographic 
proximity interacted with our network variables.  In particular, it is possible that our effects 
primarily held for individual who worked in different locations while our network variables had no 
effect when two individuals could communicate with each other offline.  To examine this issue, 
we estimated models in which we split our analysis by our same geographic location variable.  
We found that the estimated network effects were larger when two individuals worked in 
different geographic locations versus when they worked in the same location.  But in each 
instance, however, the coefficients led to the same substantive conclusions as the coefficients 
24	
	
discussed in the text.  The coefficients provide some support for a potential substitution effect 
but the potential substitution effect appears to be modest. 
Our final robustness check considered an alternative specification for our shared third 
party variable.  Our shared third party variable is an indicator of triadic closure.  It is essentially a 
count of the number of contacts two individuals have in common.  Our shared third party 
however, ignores the potential influence of relationships between shared third parties.  It is 
possible that a potential knowledge recipient r will be even more successful in motivating a 
knowledge source s to share knowledge if s and r share many contacts and if those contacts 
are connected to each other.  Put differently, the influence that a shared third party q has on the 
s-r interaction can also vary with the presence of another shared third party k, how strongly s 
and r are connected to q and k and the strength of the q-k relationship.  To capture this potential 
influence, we modified our shared third party variable: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑇𝑃!"#  =  (𝑍!"#𝑍!"#! + 𝛼 𝑍!"#𝑍!"#! 𝑍!"#) 
Closure around the s-r interaction increased with the presence of many shared third parties, 
especially when those third parties are also strongly connected to each other.  We do not modify 
our unshared third party variable because that variable already captures the potential influence 
that a relationship between two people outside of the s-r interaction can have on how s interacts 
with r.  The second part of the equation above is the modification and its influence (i.e., 𝛼) on 
knowledge sharing was estimated empirically.  The empirical results using this modified shared 
third party variable were informative.  Without the modification, we found that shared third 
parties increased the likelihood that s would start to share knowledge with r and the estimate 
equaled .779.  We also found that shared third parties increased the odds that s would continue 
to share knowledge with r over time and the estimate equaled 1.439.  The modified shared third 
party variable allows us to distinguish the triadic closure effect from an effect that while 
correlated with triadic closure was in fact due to the influence of relationships with and between 
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the third parties s and r share.  Using the modified variable, we found that with respect to 
initiating a relationship, the effect for triadic closure equaled .684 and the estimated 𝛼 effect 
equaled .094.  With respect to continuing a relationship, the effect for triadic closure equaled 
1.294 and the estimated 𝛼 effect equaled .120.  The results suggest that in addition to triadic 
closure, relationships to and among mutual third parties also contributed to initiating and 
sustaining knowledge transfer relationships.  Relationships between third parties are often 
implicit in network theorizing but are rarely estimated empirically.  Our modification represents 
one way to capture the potential influence of relationships between shared third parties. 
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
Third parties play a prominent role in network-based explanations for successful 
knowledge transfer.  When two people share a large number of contacts, refusing to help one 
another could damage their reputation.  Third parties to an interaction, however, are often 
unshared and unshared third parties can make it more difficult for two individuals to work 
collaboratively.  But with a few notable exceptions (Burt and Knez 1995; Labianca et al. 1998), 
unshared third parties have been ignored in empirical analysis.  Any potential negative 
unshared third party effect is often equated to forgoing any potential shared third party effect. 
Our findings illustrate the value of considering shared and unshared third parties in empirical 
analysis.  In our analysis of an online technical forum, we found that shared third parties made it 
more likely that a knowledge sharing relationship would be initiated and maintained over time, 
while unshared third parties had a negative influence on the same process.  We also found that 
the degree of knowledge overlap among unshared third parties limited the magnitude of the 
negative unshared third party effect.  This suggests that satisfying unshared third parties was 
more demanding when there was less knowledge overlap among them; meeting multiple 
demands exacerbated the negative influence unshared third parties had on knowledge sharing.  
Our research findings have a number of managerial and theoretical implications. 
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With respect to management practice, consider a manager who would like to create a 
work environment that encourages the transfer of knowledge between individuals who do not 
overlap in their knowledge and expertise?  The manager has at least two alternatives.  One 
alternative is for the manager to create groups that are heterogeneous with respect to 
knowledge and encourages the members of each group to share their knowledge and expertise.  
Our empirical results suggest that this approach could eventually undermine knowledge sharing 
behavior.  In particular, among our knowledge workers, shared third parties promoted 
knowledge transfer but the positive shared third party effect was less positive when the degree 
of knowledge overlap among shared third parties was low.  And moreover, when knowledge 
overlap in a group was low, each member was less likely to initiate and sustain external 
knowledge transfer relationships, presumably because when knowledge overlap was low, 
sharing knowledge was more demanding and time consuming.  Under this alternative it would 
be harder to create a cohesive group and if a cohesive group emerges it is likely to come at the 
expense of relationships outside the group.  An alternative is to create homogenous groups and 
to encourage individuals to initiate and cultivate external knowledge transfer relationships that 
provide access to diverse knowledge and expertise.  Our results suggest that this alternative 
arrangement could turn out to be more effective.  Thus our findings inform management practice 
by helping us to understand and appreciate the conditions under which attempts to encourage 
the development of more diverse interactions is more likely to be successful and sustained over 
time. 
Our findings also make a number of theoretical contributions.  We contribute to a 
growing body of literature that has documented the importance of different network features for 
successful knowledge transfer.  For example, prior research suggests that more frequent 
exposure to diverse knowledge and information can increase an individual’s capacity for sharing 
knowledge (Reagans and McEvily 2003, 2008; Levina and Vaast 2005).  If we assume that an 
individual is more likely to acquire a greater capacity for knowledge transfer if he or she is able 
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to maintain diverse relationships longer, our findings indicate that how an individual is exposed 
to diverse knowledge influences the likelihood that he or she will be able to acquire a greater 
capacity for knowledge transfer.  And thus our findings advance our understanding of the 
network dynamics that provide individuals with an opportunity to acquire a greater capacity for 
knowledge transfer. 
Our research findings also contribute to a much broader literature concerned with the 
benefits shared third parties and bridges can introduce.  The general consensus is that shared 
third parties and bridges (i.e., relationships with outsiders) provide access to distinct benefits 
and resources.  Shared third parties promote cooperation and collaboration within a social 
group (Ingram and Roberts 2000).  Bridges between groups provide access to more diverse 
knowledge and information and can also be sources of power and influence (Burt 1992; Burt 
2010; Reagans and Zuckerman 2008a, b).  While the network-based benefits are distinct, it is 
generally understood bridges and shared third parties can be in opposed and especially when 
transmission requires a strong bridge (Granovetter 1973).  Shared third parties within a group 
represent unshared third parties to relationships that bridge groups and unshared third parties 
undermine the formation of strong bridges.  Thus, the benefits that shared third parties introduce 
generally come at the expense of the benefits provided by bridges.  While this belief is 
widespread, the empirical evidence for this tradeoff is inconclusive, with some scholars finding 
that unshared third parties do in fact make it more difficult for an individual to interact with 
outsiders (Burt and Knez 1995; Labianca et al. 1998), while other scholars have found that 
individuals can maintain strong ties within a group while simultaneously maintaining strong ties 
with individuals outside the group (Reagans et al. 2004).  Our findings sharpen our 
understanding of when both network-based benefits will be obtained versus when we can 
expect for them to be traded off.  For example, Aral and Van Alstyne (2011) propose a tradeoff 
between networks that can sustain the transfer of complex knowledge and networks that 
provide access to the most diverse knowledge.  The successful transfer of tacit or complex 
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knowledge requires a strong or high bandwidth connection.  Aral and Van Alstyne illustrate their 
tradeoff by contrasting a closed network with high bandwidth ties against an open network full of 
low bandwidth ties (see figure 1, pg. 95 in Aral and Van Alstyne 2011).  The proposed tradeoff 
rests on the idea that shared third parties have a positive influence on the bandwidth of a 
relationship (pg. 94-95).  And yet we know that strong ties can and often do emerge when 
shared third parties are absent, so much so that it is often useful to treat the two network 
features as if they are only weakly correlated (Reagans and McEvily 2003; Sosa 2011).  High 
bandwidth ties can develop in an open network, and so open networks can provide access to 
diverse knowledge while simultaneously facilitating the transfer of more complex knowledge.  
The tradeoff could also be realized, however, if unshared third parties make it difficult for an 
individual to have a strong tie with an outsider.  Our empirical results indicate when this tradeoff 
is more likely to be extreme versus more modest.  Return to the relationship between Sarah and 
Roy, which is a bridge.  The relationships that Sarah and Roy have with Allen and Alvin 
increase the odds of their relationship forming and also introduce stability into their relationship.  
Bob, Bill and Ben represent unshared third parties to the Sarah-Roy interaction and make it less 
likely that their bridge relationship will emerge and grow stronger over time.  Indeed, the 
unshared third party effects that we observed are larger than the shared third party effects.  
Thus, it isn’t the absence of shared third parties that prevent high-bandwidth bridges from 
emerging; it is the presence of unshared third parties that reduce the likelihood of a bridge 
forming or becoming high bandwidth over time, especially when those unshared third parties 
make heterogeneous requests and demands.  Thus, in the context of knowledge transfer, our 
framework more clearly illuminates when one would expect to observe a tradeoff between the 
distinct benefits that third parties and bridges can introduce.9 
																																								 																				
9	It	is	important	to	remember	an additional benefit an open network can provide, which is autonomy.  In an open 
network, one can more freely reallocate limited bandwidth across different relationships to take advantage of 
whatever immediate opportunities a specific bridge can provide.  So what might appear to be a tradeoff at a single 
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 We conclude with a final thought on brokerage.  Ronald Burt has documented the 
numerous advantages that individuals who maintain connections that bridge network groups 
and communities enjoy (Burt 2010).  Individuals who maintain relationships that act as bridges 
between groups are brokers and Burt has distinguished brokers from individuals who maintain 
relationships with colleagues who travel in the same group or community.  While Burt has 
emphasized the importance of maintaining relationships that bridge different groups, David 
Krackhardt has called our attention to the internal structure of the bridged groups (Krackhadt 
1999).  Krackhardt argued that being a broker between two cohesive groups (i.e., a bowtie 
network) could be so difficult and demanding that an individual occupying such a position could 
end up being worse off than if he simply lived in a single group.  We cannot test the 
performance implications of living in a bowtie network, but we can speak to the stability of a 
bowtie position.  Our figure 1 is a modified version of figure 1.c from Krackhardt’s 1999 article 
(pg. 188).  Our research findings illustrate how difficult it can be to be a bridge between two 
internally cohesive groups.  Shared third parties in one group represent unshared third parties in 
the other group, thereby making it more difficult to remain connected to both groups over time.  
Our findings also illustrate how homogeneity with respect to knowledge in those groups offset 
the negative influence that unshared third parties had on the stability of a relationship.  While we 
certainly believe that knowledge homogeneity reduced the difficulties unshared third parties 
introduced in the context of knowledge transfer, we can also imagine that homogeneity with 
respect to factors and characteristics that demarcate a social identity could very well make it 
more difficult to be a bridge between two internally cohesive groups.  We cannot address this 
issue with our data, but we believe that focusing on identity-based dynamics at the third party 
level is certainly worthwhile. 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
point in time might turn out to be the strategic reallocation of a limited resource over time (Mariotti and Delbridge 
2011). 
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Table 1: Predictors of Initiating and Sustaining Knowledge Transfer Relationships 
 
 Disconnected Connected Disconnected Connected Disconnected Connected Connected 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Predictors         
Tie Strength (TS)  1.314**  1.331**  1.349** 1.394** 
        
Knowledge Overlap        
Dyadic Knowledge Overlap (DKO) 0.691* 0.869** 0.626** 0.815** 0.649** 0.836** 0.848** 
   DKO X TS  0.443***  0.449***  0.425*** 0.318*** 
 Knowledge Overlap among Shared Third Parties (KOSTP)     0.557*** 0.754*** 0.707*** 
    KOSTP X TS      0.273* 0.299* 
Knowledge Overlap among Unshared Third Parties (KOUSTP)     -0.087 -0.251* -0.304** 
   KOUSTP X TS      -0.064 -0.058 
        
Third Parties        
Shared Third Parties (STP) 1.342*** 2.273*** 0.504*** 2.214*** 0.779*** 1.542*** 1.439*** 
    STP X DKO 1.831*** 2.519*** 1.451*** 2.375*** 1.788*** 2.449*** 2.436*** 
    STP X DKO X TS       0.874*** 
    STP X KOSTP     0.587*** 1.378*** 1.004*** 
    STP X TS  0.715**  0.591**  0.521* 0.463* 
    STP X KOSTP X TS       0.196** 
        
 Unshared Third Parties (USTP)   -5.209*** -6.268*** -3.399*** -4.136*** -4.157*** 
   USTP X DKO   1.002*** 1.404*** 1.108*** 1.391*** 1.469*** 
   USTP X DKO X TS       0.194 
   USTP X KOUSTP     0.258*** 0.331*** 0.291*** 
   USTP X TS    -1.178***  -1.201*** -0.987*** 
   USTP X KOUSTP X TS       0.079** 
        
Controls        
Recipient’s Centrality (RC) 0.559*** 0.625*** 0.504*** 0.592*** 0.501*** 0.521*** 0.539*** 
   RC X DKO 0.334*** 0.497** 0.298** 0.513** 0.301** 0.559** 0.532** 
Source’s Centrality (SC) 0.693*** 0.707*** 1.197*** 0.719*** 1.194*** 0.617*** 0.698*** 
   SC X DKO  0.512*** 0.895*** 0.595*** 0.872*** 0.593*** 0.995*** 0.948*** 
Both Male 0.348 0.354 0.315 0.329 0.314 0.339 0.354 
Both Female 0.421 0.431 0.385 0.461 0.385 0.454 0.451 
Same Geographic Location 0.739*** 0.713*** 0.707*** 0.694*** 0.708*** 0.701*** 0.689*** 
        
Number of Observations 20,532,866 347,720 20,532,866 347,720 20,532,866 347,720 347,720 
Model Fit (McFadden's R-Squared) 0.081 0.144 0.108 0.179 0.117 0.201 0.219 
Log Likelihood -2448287.5 -69417.4 -2156405.2 -66094.2 -1987640.2 -62195.3 -60009.1 
The stars in table 1 indicate significance levels.  * = p <.10, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < 001. 
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Table 2: Marginal Unshared Third Party Effect for Disconnected Dyads 
Knowledge overlap among unshared third parties is high  b(1) = -1.979, p < .001 
Knowledge overlap among unshared third parties is low b(2) = -4.105, p < .001 
A Wald test indicates that b(1) is greater than b(2) ( p < .001). 
Table 3: Marginal Unshared Third Party Effect for Connected Dyads 
 High tie strength Low tie strength 
Knowledge overlap among unshared 
third parties is high 
b(1) = -2.162, p < .001 b(2) = -2.176, p < .001 
Knowledge overlap among unshared 
third parties is low 
b(3) = -4.551, p < .001 b(4) = -4.845, p < .001 
Wald tests indicate that b(1) is greater than b(3) ( p < .001) and that b(2) is greater than b(4) ( p 
< .001). 
